Touching on the region’s perennial historical disputes, Mitter noted that 1945 ― the end of World War II ― left “unfinished business” for East Asia as unlike in Europe, there was no real consensus about the postwar regional order.

On the issue of a recalcitrant North Korea becoming a strategic liability for its patron China, the scholar said that China was likely to attempt to keep the dictatorial regime “reasonably stable” given that having a pro-Beijing regime on its borders was a strong security asset for the rising power.

“I think it is also highly unlikely that China would support a unified Korea in the short term,” he added.

The following is the interview with Dr. Mitter.

Korea Herald: China’s economy continues its growth and has surpassed that of the U.S. in terms of the purchasing power parity to become the world’s largest. What will this mean in terms of the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region?

Rana Mitter: The growth in China’s economy means that the country has become a serious contender in the region. For most of the past millennium, of course, China was the dominant country in the region ― the so-called “Sinosphere.” It’s only in the past century and a half that China’s role has been so significantly reduced. So, now that China’s economy has once again placed it at the top of the global table, one has to wonder what this means for hegemony in the region. However, so far, China has been slow to convert its economic strength into wider influence in the region.

Everyone wants to trade with China, but the U.S. remains the dominant security power, whether it’s formal agreements with the likes of the ROK (Republic of Korea) or Japan, or else more informal support to (ironically, as a former enemy) Vietnam. China has to make the transition that the U.S. made in the region a generation ago: economic strength is a starting point, but creating a regional system that other powers will willingly sign up to is a longer-term task and can’t be achieved without time and effort.

KH: In recent years, China has apparently been moving to alter the regional security and financial orders: It has sought to create a new regional security mechanism that excludes the U.S., pushed for a “maritime silk road” policy and pursued the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. What do you think about China’s intentions behind all these moves?

Mitter: China is keen to create a new regional order that will enable it to take the leading role in the region. There is nothing wrong with the idea of a greater Chinese presence in the region, nor is there anything wrong with healthy strategic competition. Other powers in the region may do better if they have a choice of leading powers to engage with. However, at the moment, China has not worked out how to create a policy that will attract regional powers away from the security embrace of the U.S. The U.S. learned painfully that sometimes, to engender confidence in smaller powers, it was necessary to give up aspects of its own power. (So, Japan was allowed to run a trade policy highly disadvantageous to the U.S. for much of the Cold War, as a means of cementing the U.S.-Japan security alliance). At the moment, regional perceptions are that China is a purely pragmatic power in the region. It’s time for some big, counter-intuitive gestures that show that Beijing wants the regional order to serve the interests of all its members.

KH: The U.S. Forces Korea is hoping to bring in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, an advanced missile defense asset, to the Korean Peninsula. China has expressed its concerns about the potential deployment of the THAAD as its radar system could put China within its monitoring range. What do you think about China’s concerns?

Mitter: China has a reasonable concern if there are nuclear missiles within reach of its territory; the United States was not enthusiastic about the prospect of missiles in Cuba more than half a century ago! That said, the best answer to the proposal is for Beijing to step up its efforts to make the Pyongyang regime evolve faster. China has much more influence in the DPRK (North Korea) than the U.S., and helping to resolve the regional crisis would be a real bonus for China’s stated desire to be a “good citizen” in the region.

KH: Can you be more specific about how the North should evolve?

Mitter: Broadly speaking I mean ... that the DPRK should socialize into the major global and regional forums more actively. This would include getting rid of nuclear weapons but also becoming part of international structures on everything from trade to human rights.

KH: China has been striving to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula as it faces a slew of challenges such as income disparities, a slowing economy, political reform, maritime disputes and etc. Do you think China will allow North Korea to continue developing its nuclear capability?

Mitter: I suspect that North Korea is as much of a problem for Beijing as it sometimes is for the U.S. I also suspect that Beijing is not enthusiastic about the DPRK’s attempts to achieve nuclear status. However, I think it is also highly unlikely that China would support a unified Korea in the short term, as having a pro-Beijing regime on its borders is helpful for China’s security. So it may be that China seeks to rein in Pyongyang’s more extravagant demands and threats to reduce the danger of regime collapse in the face of a ratcheting up of tension in the region.

KH: What do you think about North Korea’s strategic value for China?

Mitter: Having a pro-Chinese regime on its borders is a strong security asset for China. Although the specific actions of the Kim Jong-un regime are no doubt deeply annoying to Beijing, it still seems to me most likely that China will attempt to keep the DPRK regime reasonably stable.

KH: Democracy protests in Hong Kong reaffirmed that there has been a growing public desire for political freedom and democratization. Do you think these movements pose a grave threat to the Chinese government?

Mitter: The Hong Kong democracy movement is unlikely to pose any threat to the Chinese government. The protesters have always emphasized that their interest is in more popular suffrage in Hong Kong, not the mainland. Nor is there evidence of much stimulation of democratic sentiment in the mainland on the back of the Hong Kong protests. The Hong Kong democratization debate will, in the end, be about the direction of Hong Kong ― as in the term “one country, two systems.”

KH: East Asia has been engulfed in historical and territorial disputes ― although the region is quite integrated in terms of trade, tourism and cultural exchanges. Do you have any suggestions on ways to promote regional multilateral cooperation for peace and stability?

Mitter: I’ve long argued that 1945 ― the end of World War II ― was “unfinished business” in East Asia. Unlike in Europe, there was never a real consensus about the postwar order in the region, not least because China was excluded from the dominant settlement in the region that included the division of Korea, the maintenance of the Republic of China on Taiwan, the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

Now that China is more powerful than during the Cold War, and is more aware of its historical past, there is an urgency in the region about reassessing the past. At the moment, however, every country in East Asia tends to see recent history only through its own eyes ― so China sees it through Chinese eyes, Japan through Japanese, and Korea through Korean eyes. My suggestion is that we need much more empathy for each other’s histories. Students and politicians alike should learn how the view looks from the other side: Chinese should understand more about why the Japanese think as they do; the Japanese need to understand Korea’s viewpoint more than they had. If we could create a truly transnational understanding of history across the region, that would be a great addition to mutual understanding, an understanding which simply is not there as it is between France and Germany today.

KH: South Korea has a security alliance with the U.S. and at the same time, it wants to maintain a close partnership with China for trade, business and tourism. This could put South Korea in an increasingly tricky diplomatic position. What would be a wise way for South Korea to maneuver in this rough diplomatic field?

Mitter: South Korea is not the only country in that odd position; for instance, Australia’s economy is highly dependent on sending minerals to China, but is very much within the diplomatic embrace of the U.S. South Korea needs to draw on one of its greatest qualities: the move to democracy in the past three decades. By affirming that whatever strategic choices are made must be confirmed by the Korean people, South Korea’s leaders should find themselves in a good position to balance interests.

KH: Can you elaborate further on how Korean leaders should “balance interests”?

Mitter: In a democracy, it is very hard for politicians to undertake policies that their citizens do not support. That provides both a positive and a negative strength. The positive strength is that governments can seek support through the ballot box for their policies. The negative strength ― but it is a strength not a weakness ― is that elected governments can resist pressure from external powers by showing that there are certain policies that their populations would not accept.

KH: Japan has been pushing for a stronger military to undertake a greater security role under the slogan of “active pacifism.” This has triggered security concerns for South Korea and China as it has come as Japan still denies its wartime atrocities. What kind of security role do you think Japan seeks to play through its heavier armament?

Mitter: These moves are really driven by the political concerns of the current Japanese Prime Minister Abe, who sits on the right wing of the governing LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). However, people should remember that there are many different groups and viewpoints in Japan, which is an established and pluralist democracy. It’s not true that “Japan” denies its wartime atrocities ― there are right-wingers who do this, but also plenty of liberal and moderate voices who not only have acknowledged Japan’s violent wartime past but offered very sincere regrets. Don’t forget that the Japanese historical profession is one of the most important sources of the historical research that exposed issues ranging from the Nanjing Massacre to the sexual exploitation of the comfort women.

KH: The U.S. has been seeking to enhance the trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan. The triangular partnership has lost traction due to the diplomatic tension between Seoul and Tokyo. What do you think about the prospect of the trilateral relationship?

Mitter: The tension lies in the fact that the current elected leaders of South Korea and Japan do not get on well with each other. But the benefit of democracy is that leaders change peacefully in time. This issue, too, will change with time. It seems to me likely that Seoul will continue to strengthen its trade and cultural ties with Beijing while relying on Washington for defense. This sort of triangulation is useful to Korea to prevent it being too tied to any one power.

KH: What do you think are the major differences between the Soviet-U.S. rivalry during the Cold War and the current Sino-U.S. rivalry? One of them could be deep economic interdependence.

Mitter: The real difference is ideology. The USSR and U.S. had very different visions of the world in the Cold War. China does not really seek to impose its own system on any other society, and the U.S. too is more concerned with security than nation-building, particularly after the disaster of Iraq. So I think we need to think of the current era as one of great power relationships rather than of a new Cold War.

KH: Do you have any projections of your own about the future of the Kim Jong-un regime in Pyongyang? Do you think it can continue to remain in power when its people are starving and its isolation is deepening?

Mitter: The Kim regime is one of the most brutal in the world. However, it has shown a shrewd cunning about knowing how far to push things. Despite an appearance of crisis and instability, it has shown a remarkable capacity to survive and I don’t see an immediate crisis point in prospect.


Rana Mitter

● Mitter is the director of the University China Centre at the University of Oxford, where he lectures on the history and politics of modern China. He also specializes in nationalism, the Cold War and Sino-Japanese relations.

● He has written several books including “A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World,” for which he was named Young Academic Author of the Year by the Times Higher Education Supplement in 2005.

● His most recent book, “China’s War with Japan, 1937-45: The Struggle for Survival,” was named as a 2013 Book of the Year by the Financial Times and the Economist.

● He contributes regularly to programs on television and radio, commenting on contemporary Chinese politics and society. He is also a regular presenter of programs on music, the arts and ideas on BBC Radio 3.

● His reviews and essays have appeared in newspapers including the Financial Times, International New York Times, Guardian, Telegraph and Outlook (India).

● He received both his B.A. and Ph.D. from Cambridge.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)